Derrida and Searle: A Debate on the Illocutionary Status of Fictional Utterances

Abstract

The aim of the present article is to discuss how fictional utterances can be seperated from serious ones in light of the performative-constative distinction set forth by Austin. Austin, who contended that fictional utterances are parasitic upon serious ones and terminated the reflection before maturation, leaves this task of discussing the true nature of the issue to Derrida and Searle. The debate between Derrida and Searle, on the other hand, is based on whether the issue at hand can be solved in terms of the purposes of conscious subjects, or, intentionality. In contrast to Searle who is unwilling to abandon the paradigm of intentionality, according to the concept of iterability put forward by Derrida, the aims of the agent are not determinant for the serious utterances as well as the fictional ones.